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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Malaysia is a small country but has some big achievements to its credit in the field of economic 
development. Starting as a low income country in 1957, it has long climbed up the ladder into 
the upper middle grouping in the World Development Reports. Its per capita income at constant 
prices rose from US$ 306 in 1965 to US$ 5490 in 2007 and its economy with GDP worth 357.9 
billion US dollars occupied the 29th position in the world with per capita income rank at 57 the 
same year.  
 
Geographic location, an abundance of natural resources, especially in agriculture, forestry and 
mineral, a small population with low density, a work friendly climate, and a plural social order 
have been the initial advantages the country enjoyed. However, there was a lack of capital, and a 
shortage of both skilled and unskilled manpower. The size of domestic market was too small to 
warrant industrialization. Expediency demanded that the country evolve a policy design that 
could cash on its strengths and convert its deficiencies into advantages keeping at the same time 
her options flexible. This paper takes a brief look at the contours of its economic transformation 
and the major policy light houses that guided her sail along merrily for over half a century.  
 
II. POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
Direction planning has been a major factor in shaping the economic destiny of Malaysia. It has 
been instrumental in achieving social goals like the redistribution of wealth, and the provision of 
vital public utilities.  The transformation process adopted an open economy model, choosing 
trade as its engine of growth. The country provided infrastructural facilities, tax concessions, and 
unrestricted remittance options to attract foreign capital It rapidly expanded education and 
training facilities for human resource development; Malaysia has already past the UNDP 
threshold for high human development and was ranked 63 with her index at 0.811 in 2005 as per 
HDR for the year 2008. In addition, the country brought in a large number of foreign workers 
and professionals to fill the critical gaps, even as their presence in large numbers caused some 
socio-cultural problems. 
 
The country ensured an efficient coordination of major sectors and kept economy operating 
almost friction-free. The hurdles and crises that came along occasionally were managed well. 
The leadership had a long run view for development from the very start which eventually 
culminated in what is known as Vision 2020. It aimed at achieving a per capita income of US $ 
10,000 by that year. With an average growth rate of 7%, it was well on course until late nineties, 
when it suffered a setback during the Asian financial crisis and had to devalue its currency by 
about a third making the task difficult.  
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III. THE TRANSFORMATION 
 
Malaysia started its economic journey with dependence on rubber, tin and oil palm. These three 
commodities along with other raw materials had already set her economic tempo prior to 
independence. During the seventies the country decided on shifting from the primary sector to 
manufacturing under a protection regimen. Foreign assistance from Japan and the West eased 
and hastened the process of transformation. Exports of manufactured goods were soon fuelling 
her growth. The structure of the economy underwent rapid transformation. The share of the 
primary sector declined progressively from 42.7% in 1970 to a mere 16.7% in 2006. The 
industrial and services sectors both expanded but the share of the services grew much faster.   
 
Table 1: Sector contribution to GDP (%) 
Sectors 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
Agriculture         1 29.0 22.9 18.7 8.6 7.9 
Mining                2 13.7 10.1 9.7 7.5 8.8 
Primary           1+2 42.7 33.0 28.4 16.1 16.7 
Manufacturing   3 13.9 19.6 27.0 32.3 31.1 
Construction      4 3.8 4.6 3.5 3.3 3.1 
Secondary      3+4 17.7 24.2 30.5 35.6 34.2 
Services:            5 36.2 40.0 42.3 53.6 51.8 
Others*               6 3.4 2.8 -1.2 -5.3 -2.7 
Tertiary      5+6 39.6 42.8 41.1 48.3 49.1 
               Source the Table has been constructed using information in the Statistical annexure in the Bank  
               Negara Annual Reports for the relevant years. 
 
However, the declining share of agriculture in the GDP should not be misunderstood as 
neglecting its importance in the economy. Rising food prices, dependence on imports even for 
chicken feed, increasing demand for palm oil and natural rubber abroad have led to a renewed 
interest in the sector and a special fund for the development of agriculture has been established at 
the federal level. The country is now in the third phase of the National Agricultural Policy for 
directing towards the agro-year 2010. Diversification is encouraged and taking place in the 
expanding industrial sector. This was made possible by the simultaneous and rapid expansion of 
the services sector. Malaysia spent colossal amounts on developing infrastructural facilities to 
good effect.   
 
IV CRSIS MANAGEMENT 
 
The Asian crisis announced its arrival in Malaysia with an abrupt fall in the Kuala Lumpur 
Composite Index (KLCI) on July 29, 1997 accompanied with a depreciation of the Ringgit. Both 
trends were gaining pace unabated by the following week; one could clearly see the economy 
rolling down the hill. During the 63 weeks from July 1997 to September 1998, the stock market 
fell by over 68% and the domestic currency lost no less than 37% in terms of US dollar. The 
nexus between the two markets was: sell stocks at KLSE and with Ringgits so released buy 
dollars in the forex market to take out. This hastened the melt down in both the markets. The 
consequence: short term foreign capital worth 33 billion US dollars left the country in a short 
span of time and her economy suffered a negative rate of growth (-7.5%) in 1998. 
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Most of the literature on the subject does not deny the stated market nexus but there has been 
much difference of opinion on two vital issues: (i) what was essentially responsible for the crisis 
– internal economic weaknesses or external forces - and (ii) the imposition of credit controls with 
dollar peg for the currency or going to the IMF like others in the region was the better remedial 
choice. Most economists at the national circuit were critical of the government for blaming 
solely the outsiders for the crisis and choosing capital controls as the cure. I found it difficult to 
go with them. 
 
A crisis by definition is an unforeseeable short-term shock. This is why no one could or did fire a 
warning shot then as in the current global melt down now. Its occurring or intensity could not be 
determined by distant happenings; for, it is perceptions that abruptly overtake rationality in a 
crisis situation. Malaysian economy had weaknesses; which economy does not. Nevertheless, her 
economic fundamentals around the crisis were by no means fragile. Even in 1997 the economy 
grew at 7.8%, inflation stayed low (2.7%), trade-GDP ratio was 1.86 and exports exceeded 
imports by 12%. The debt service ratio to export earnings too did not cross 6.7% during the 
period. Indeed, there is a well researched conclusion in the literature that currency speculators 
played a leading role in the 1997-1998 crises. Even the IMF admitted in 2001 that Malaysia was 
essentially the victim of contagion. 
 
Individual countries are so different from one another in their structures, political affiliations, 
resources and social ethos that comparing their results for policies looks quite hazardous. Still, 
Malaysia opting for controls perhaps made a better choice. The country maintained its self-
esteem and came out of the crisis less scathed and faster than those like Thailand and South 
Korea who went for the IMF bailout programs. Table 2 juxtaposes some key variables for the 
three economies for the years 1996-2000 in support of the observation. It was not, for example, 
until July 31, 2003 that Thailand could fully clear the IMF loan of US $ 14.5 billion which the 
country got as part of a reform package. On the occasion her Prime Minister vowed on the 
television that the country would never enter into the bail-out support of the US based financial 
institution again. It would be a mistaken view that Malaysia gained nothing by taking a different 
route to meet the crisis. If nothing else it certainly saw fewer bankruptcies and, therefore, 
unemployment remained within normal limits. Indeed, the country eventually won praise from 
the IMF itself for her reforms including capital controls.  
 
                                  Table 2: Key comparative variables for Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand 
     
      Countries 
                                    Years 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Real GDP growth % 
Malaysia 8.6 7.3 - 7.4 6.1 8.3 
South Korea 5.5 5.0 - 6.7 10.7 9.3 
Thailand 7.1 -1.4 -10.5 4.4 4.6 
Unemployment % 
Malysia 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.4 3.1 
South Korea 2.0 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1 
Thailand 0.9 4.4 4.2 3.6 3.3 
Current BP as % of GDP 
Malaysia -4.8 -5.2 13.2 15.9 9.4 
South Korea -4.4 -1.7 12.7 6 2.7 
Thailand -7.9 -2.0 12.8 10.2 7.6 
                       Source: Calculations based on data from World Development Reports   
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Malaysia being a wide open economy with US as its major trade partner cannot remain, like 
other countries in the world, unaffected by the current global melt down though its growth rate is 
still not in the red. The country is in a relatively better position to face the impact. It has a steady 
domestic demand, labour market is stable and there currently is a huge external reserve of around 
US $110 billion which is sufficient to finance nine months imports. Furthermore, there is a 
declining trend of non-performing loans in the financial sector; adequate liquidity exists in the 
system. Also, the development of Islamic banking and insurance lends a measure of stability to 
the financial sector. The country is in a strong position to face the current economic challenges. 
Its precautionary measures are putting money straight into the hands of those who have high 
propensity to spend; the country is supporting its unemployed by enrolling them into public 
funded training schemes for improvement of skills in addition to shortening waiting period to 
move into new jobs.  
 
V. SOCIAL EQUILIZATION 
 
The social equalization programme of Malaysia, now known as the new economic policy (NEP) 
has been one of a kind in the world: in a social contract, the haves have voluntarily agreed to 
grant economic concessions to the have-nots to increase their share in the national cake. This is 
intended to reduce poverty and improve income distribution. Though impact is slow for a variety 
of reasons but of late things are brightening up. The population below the poverty line is now 
reported as no more than 13% albeit the rise in urban poverty due to migration from rural to 
urban centres is disquieting. The Gini coefficient for the country is on the decline and stood at 
49.2 in 1997, the latest survey year. The narrowing of the gap is accounted for by the fall in the 
share of top 20% in the GNP combined with an improvement in the share of 40% in the middle 
and lower income groups. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Malaysia has done remarkably well in economic development. Natural endowments, sound 
policies, socio-cultural ethos and political stability have all combined, as the foregoing 
discussion shows, to hasten her pace on road to economic prosperity. The country has taken in its 
stride the challenges it faced on various fronts and shows resilience to meet those ahead. No two 
countries are alike; each grows in its own way. Malaysia is a unique case but what others can 
learn from her is national unity, accommodation, patience, consultation, management styles and 
a measure of self confidence that have been among the factors making her sail smooth and fast 
through turbulent global environment.      
 
